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The paper finds that countries which practice democracy are less prone to unequal 
outcomes especially when it comes to wage inequality and income inequality whereas 
autocracy  is  associated  with  higher  level  of  wage  inequalities  but  its  impact  on 
income  inequalities  are  insignificant.  Though  under  good  economic  management, 
autocracies may redistribute incomes from the richest to the poorest, more generally 
an autocratic set up violates the median voter hypothesis.  The results also show that 
political stability and voice and accountability are more sensitive to inequalities than 
democracy and autocracy which is to say that the countries which are politically 
stable and practice accountability also form more equal societies.  
 
 
JEL Codes: F-15, I-3, O1, N40 




1.  Introduction: 
 
 
In an effort to achieve economic efficiency, most countries have dismantled their 
barriers to international trade in goods and services during the last couple of decades. 
As a result, the size of world trade in goods and services has dramatically increased. 
Few success stories have also emerged as an outcome of contemporary globalisation. 
China and India, have witnessed unprecedented rise in their growth rates as well as 
significant poverty alleviation. However for most countries, globalisation has come 
with  mixed experiences. Most rich and middle income countries are experiencing 
rising  economic  inequality  generated  by  skill  biased  technological  change, 
international  trade  and  other  factors  related  to  globalisation  (Smeeding,  2002).  
Despite integration to the world economy, most countries of Latin America, Africa 
(i.e, Sub Saharan Africa) and some in Asia have failed to accomplish decent growth 
rates. In many countries in the South, poverty has increased. Even if some could grow 
at a decent rate, they have failed to put a downward pressure on the increasing trends   2
in  poverty  levels.  Even  in  China  and  India,  the  falling  poverty  trends  are  not 
sustainable, as there is an evidence of rapid rising inequalities.  
 
Though  the  world  after  the  very  surge  of  colonialism  transformed  into  a  land  of 
unequal  opportunities,  last  century  has  witnessed  a  worse  deal  where  global 
inequalities  have  partly  lead  to  regional  inequalities  and  then  the  come  back  of 
contemporary globalisation entailing post modernism had brought inequality to the 
very  door  step  of  each  country  where  rural  and  urban  divides  have  been  ever 
increasing so much so that recently it has become of policy importance to consider 
inequality as a significant factor which may stifle growth promoting strategies and 
even reverse what good growth may bring to the society.  
 
In the retrospect, the problem of poverty can not be separated from the way in which 
growth is achieved. So, other than economic growth, what is the point of reference to 
economic  development especially  when  it  is  about  ensuring  equity?  Under  global 
processes  of  production  where  trading  societies  learn  and  coordinate  among  each 
other to find common grounds for carrying out contemporary social norms which fits 
into international standards where business protects labour rights, promotes gender 
sensitivity,  brings  efficient  social  welfare  system  while  following  best  commerce 
practices, there are myriad of common institutions which simultaneously play a role 
in facilitating each country’s smooth exposure to global markets and international 
competition.  
 
 One of the most commonly quoted institutional factor for determining any country’s 
intellectual, social, economic and cultural progress is the notion of Democracy. Since 
all developed nations are well practiced democracies, this notion generally forms the 
popular opinion that democracy is the first step to any country’s progress.  
  
Thus to analyse what makes it tick for good economics where not only economic 
growth is achieved but its economic dividends are also distributed equally among 
different  strata  of  population  especially  in  case  of  developing  countries,  a  cross 
section analysis of developed and developing countries has been carried out in this 
paper where different definitions of political institutions are employed to analyse their 
impact on inequality while different proxies of openness/trade policy capture the free 




2.  Data and Methodology:  
 
To capture inequality we not only take GINI income inequality index (Gini) from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) but also we employ UTIP-
UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by University of Texas Inequality Project 
(UTIP) which captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. This is 
motivated by  several considerations. First, comparable and consistent measures of 
income inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-
country  coverage.  On  the  other  hand,  inequality  of  manufacturing  pay,  based  on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more stable, 
more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO measures are   3
based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC) a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, manufacturing pay 
has been measured with reasonable accuracy as a matter of official routine in most 
countries around the world for nearly forty years (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).   Further 
more  we  take  income  deciles  and  percentiles  from  UNU/WIDER  World  Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) as other proxies of inequality. Institutions or Integration 
will be guilty of inequality if it has the negative impact on the incomes of  bottom 10 
percent (low10) and positive impact on the income of the top 10 percent (high 10).  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Code  Source  Obs  Std . Dev 
Dependent         
GINI Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated 
by WIDER, 1995 
Gini  UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117  (35.00) 
UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 1999  Theil99  University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu 
155  (0.099) 
Lowest income decile, 1995 
 
Low10  UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117  (1.05) 




UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117  (2.28) 
Third income percentile, 1995  Thrd20  UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117  (2.22) 
Highest income decile, 1995  High10  UNU/WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wi
id/wiid.htm 
117  (7.50) 
Endogenous Independent         
Openness Variables         
(Exports +Imports)/GDP at current dollar prices, 
1985 
Lcopen  World Development 
Indicators 
170  (0.589) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985  Impnov85  Pritchett (1996)  96  (21.08) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1982  Impnov82  Pritchett (1996)  95  (23.85) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1985  Tars85  Pritchett (1996)  96  (36.91) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982  Tars82  Pritchett (1996)  93  (83.10) 
         
Trade Policy Variables         
Import duties as % imports,1985  Tariffs  World Development 
Indicators 
99  (8.903) 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 
1985 
Owti  Sachs and Warner (1995)  98  (0.165 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982  Txtrdg  Pritchett (1996)  54  (0.031) 
Weighted average of total import charges, 1985  Totimpov85  Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing 
countries only) 
76  (21.30) 
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate inputs, 
1985 
Owqi  Sachs and Warner (1995)  96  (0.24) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1987  Nontarr87  Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing 
countries only) 
76  (36.305) 
Sachs and Warner’s composite openness index, 
1980 
Open80s  Edwards (1998)  61  (0.446) 
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Political Institutions         
Voice and Accountability, 1999 Range: 2.5 to -2.5  Va  Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Lobaton(2003) 
170  (0.952) 
 
Political stability, 1999 












Range = 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high), Democracy Score: 
general openness of political institutions. The 11-point 











Range = 0 to -10 (0 = low; -10 = high), general 
closeness of political institutions. The 11-point 









         
Instruments         
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed 
from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ 
variables, 
Lfrkrom  Frankel and Romer (1999)  163  (16.75) 
 
Fraction of the population speaking English 
Engfrac  Hall and Jones (1999)  182  (0.236) 
 
Fraction of the population speaking one of the major 
languages of Western Europe: French, German, 
Portugese or Spanish 
Eurfrac  Hall and Jones (1999)  185  (0.380) 
         
         
Distance from the equator of capital city measured as 
abs (Latitude)/90 
Disteq  Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (AJR) (2001) 
208  (16.65) 
 
 
We also take income groups divided into quintiles where the effect of Institutions is 
anticipated to be negative for the ratio between top 20 percent and bottom 20 percent 
(high20/low20) and positive for the middle income groups (Middle20). The exercise 
on  income  deciles and  percentiles  will  further  shed  light  on  how  institutions  and 
integration are related with income distribution. Especially, we are interested to know 
how quality of institutions is related with the incomes of the middle class or the ones 
living  in  bottom  of  income  share.  Each  country  observation  for  all  inequality 
measures is taken for the latest year for which data is available and in most cases 
represent inequality in mid 1990s. 
 
Four  proxies  for  political  institutions  namely,  political  stability  (Ps),  voice  and 
accountability  (Va),  democracy  (Democ)  and  autocracy  (Autoc)  are  used.    The 
analysis incorporates not 1 but 12 various concepts of openness and trade policy in 
regression  model  in  order  to  carry  out  a  robustness  check  for  our  results  on 
institutions.  
 
The basic inequality and income share equations would look like: 
 
Inequality = f (Political Institutions, Integration, Geography) …………......... (1) 
 
and    Income Share= f (Political Institutions, Integration, Geography)………(2) 
 
Corresponding  to  equation  1,  inequality  model  say  based  on  Theil  index  has  1 
equation, whereas it corresponds to different institutional or integration combination.   5
Then, the model specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, Midlle20, Low10 and High10 
contain same classification of endogenous independent variables.  
 
i i i i i Geo Trade Polity Theil 1 1 1 1 1 1 ε δ χ β α + + + + = ……………(3) 
 
The variable  i Theil is Theil Index in a country i, i Polity  respectively measures for 
either political stability, voice and accountability, democracy or autocracy, whereas 
i Trade measures  general  openness  or  trade  policy  in  the  economy  and  i ε   is  the 
random error term.  i Geo represent distance from the equator. 
 
There  are  potential  endogenity  problems  between  institutions  and  integration  and 
between institutions and inequality itself. To this effect we have first regressed our 
institutional, trade policy and openness proxies on a set of instruments. Frankel and 
Romer  (1999)  suggests  that  we  can  instrument  for  openness  by  using  trade/GDP 
shares  constructed  on  the  basis  of  a  gravity  equation  for  bilateral  trade  flows. 
Following Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use ‘fractions of 
the population speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the 
first language (Eurfrac)’ as an instrument for political institutions. As in Rodrik et al 
(2004),  we  employ  ‘distance  from  the  equator’  as  another  instrument  (proxy  for 
geography) also employed by Hall and Jones (1999). Due to space constraints we 
directly  jump  to  second  stage  results.  First  stage  results  are  available on  request. 
Suffice  to  say  that  the  author  runs  higher  order  asymptotic  tests  and  instruments 
mostly pass the criterion. 
 
3.  Results:  
 
Due to the sheer number of specifications for which the regressions are carried out for 
six  different  dependent  variables,  it  is  not  possible  to  present  results  for  both 
institutions  and  integration  together  in  single  table.  Thus,  in  order  to  cover  all 
specifications, we discuss results by summarizing them into different categories of 
political institutions.  
 
Political  stability  generally  measures  conflict  including  military  coup  risk,  major 
insurgency rebellion, political terrorism, political assassination, civil war, major urban 
riots and the new government honouring commitments of the previous government. 
(Kaufman et al. 2003)  Although many  recent studies show that conflict and civil 
unrest  is  endogenous  to  prevalent  inequalities, it  may  also  be that  these  conflicts 
further deepen inequalities in society. That this is exactly what happens as per the 
results in table 2. Political stability ensures a more equal society. High coefficients for 
Gini  with  negative  signs  and  significance  at  1%  level  in  most  cases  show  high 
effectiveness of political stability in decreasing income inequalities. Countries who 
address  factors  of  instability  and  achieve  greater  social  harmony  among  the 
population by addressing the concerns of marginalized can more effectively address 
the problem of rising income inequalities. 
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Table 2: Political Stability 
  Dependent Variables 














             
Political Stability (Lcopen)  -0.03  -8.70  -6.39  2.19  0.58  -6.87 
  (-1.97)**  (-4.98)***  (-3.57)***  (5.49)***  (3.11)***  (-5.10)*** 
Political Stability (Impnov85)  -0.04  -8.71  -6.72  2.17  0.54  -6.68 
  (-2.23)**  (-3.69)***  (-2.67)***  (4.03)***  (2.28)**  (-3.69)*** 
Political Stability (Impnov82)  -0.03  -8.38  -6.31  2.09  0.54  -6.47 
  (-1.76)*  (-3.94)***  (-2.72)***  (4.20)***  (2.41)***  (-3.87)*** 
Political Stability (Tarshov85)  -0.04  -9.10  -6.95  2.24  0.59  -6.91 
  (-2.41)**  (-3.68)***  (-2.69)***  (3.99)***  (2.38)**  (-3.68)*** 
Political Stability (Tarshov82)  -0.04  -8.73  -6.54  2.17  0.57  -6.69 
  (-2.38)**  (-3.90)***  (-2.70)***  (4.13)***  (2.48)**  (-3.81)*** 
Political Stability (Open80s)  -0.05  -15.04  -13.32  3.21  1.25  -10.64 
  (-1.14)  (-2.40)***  (-1.95)*  (2.80)***  (2.12)**  (-2.70)*** 
Political Stability (Tariffs)  -0.002  22.35  -13.51  4.32  2.69  -14.72 
  (-0.02)  (-1.91)**  (-1.59)  (2.01)**  (1.61)  (-1.95)*** 
Political Stability (Owti)  -0.07  -13.55  -7.36  2.84  1.09  -9.31 
  (-2.33)**  (-2.83)***  (-2.27)**  (3.13)***  (2.39)**  (-2.94)*** 
Political Stability (Txtrdg)  -0.03  -14.12  -8.26  3.25  1.14  -11.23 
  (-2.29)**  (-3.49)***  (-2.09)**  (3.64)***  (2.47)**  (-3.54)*** 
Political Stability (Totimpov85)  0.0003  4.63  -4.33  -0.03  -0.69  1.45 
  (0.01)  (0.78)  (-0.55)  (-0.03)  (-1.05)  (0.33) 
Political Stability (Owqi)  -0.09  -2.84  -1.16  1.28  0.10  -3.40 
  (-1.10)  (-0.37)  (-0.23)  (1.05)  (0.17)  (-0.75) 
Political Stability (Ntarfov87)  -0.03  -16.61  -14.16  1.98  0.42  -5.59 
  (-0.42)  (-0.93)  (-1.19)  (0.98)  (0.44)  (-0.82) 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
In comparison to Gini, low coefficients of Ps for Theil99 suggest that good politics 
has a limited role to play for smoothening  out the average wage  rate in  favor of 
unskilled.  Nevertheless,  for  a  sample  of  developed  and  developing  countries,  a 
negative relationship between Theil99 and Ps means that politically stable economies, 
which  are  also  democracies  in  most instances  pay  higher  average  wages  in  labor 
markets thus putting a downward pressure on wage inequality. (Rodrik, 1998) For 
businesses  to  perform  better,  stable  political  landscape  is  a  pre-requisite.  All 
politically stable economies also have thriving manufacturing sectors with profitable 
industries  and  high  rates  of  employment  -  both  skilled  and  unskilled.  All  such 
countries would also pay relatively higher wages to unskilled due to, probably, higher 
profits and thus a downward pressure is exerted on relative wage gap. There is a 
strong redistributive effect present for Ps which further suggests that internal conflict 
resolution leads to populist governance structures which redistribute resources from 
the very  rich  to the lesser. Opposite of political stability – occurrence of  internal 
conflict may indicate towards  power struggle between different interest groups or 
different classes which would then be highly correlated with concentration of wealth 
in the hands of the few elites. The results suggest that politically stable societies not 
only  redistribute  incomes  to  the  middle-income  groups,  but  they  also  benefit  the 
lowest segments of society equally as coefficients of low10 are close to the half of the 
coefficients for Middle 20.  
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Table 3  
Voice and Accountability 
  Dependent Variables 






High20/Low20  Middle20  Low10  High10 
             
Voice and Accountability (Lcopen)  -0.02  -5.46  -4.04  1.43  0.259  -4.37 
  (-1.50)  (-4.04)***  (-2.92)***  (4.74)***  (1.71)*  (-4.20)*** 
Voice and Accountability (Impnov85)  -0.03  -5.28  -4.53  1.39  0.17  -3.99 
(-2.07)**  (3.03)***  (-2.28)**  (3.38)***  (0.87)  (-2.82)*** 
Voice and Accountability(Impnov82)  -0.02  -5.63  -4.29  1.51  0.26  -4.50 
(-1.64)*  (-3.34)***  (-2.62)***  (4.05)***  (1.49)  (-3.51)*** 
Voice and Accountability (Tarshov85)  -0.03  -5.35  -4.68  1.42  0.187  -4.07 
(-2.27)**  (-2.96)***  (-2.25)**  (3.31)***  (0.91)  (-2.76)*** 
Voice and Accountability(Tarshov82)  -0.04  -5.60  -4.81  1.52  0.28  -4.48 
(-2.48)**  (-3.43)**  (-2.57)**  (3.91)***  (1.51)  (-3.37)*** 
Voice and Accountability (Open80s)  -0.06  -4.20  -6.18  1.13  -0.11  -3.01 
(-1.12)  (-1.21)  (-1.28)  (1.54)  (-0.24)  (-1.14) 
Voice and Accountability (Tariffs)  -0.05  -19.34  -16.18  3.91  2.34  -11.68 
  (-0.75)  (-1.05)  (-0.90)  (1.10)  (0.89)  (-1.05) 
Voice and Accountability (Owti)  -0.05  -5.80  -4.14  1.50  0.23  -4.39 
  (-2.21)**  (-2.11)**  (-1.42)  (2.13)**  (0.64)  (-1.81)* 
Voice and Accountability (Txtrdg)  0.08  -12.74  -7.76  3.15  0.82  -10.76 
  (1.10)  (-2.33)**  (-1.58)  (2.52)**  (1.46)  (-2.40)** 
Voice and Accountability(Totimpov85)  0.01  3.06  -0.34  -0.56  -0.69  2.59 
(0.47)  (0.91)  (-0.08)  (-0.76)  (-1.84)*  (1.02) 
Voice and Accountability (Owqi)  -0.07  0.70  0.924  0.27  -0.46  0.054 
  (-1.24)  (0.09)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (-0.52)  (1.01) 
Voice and Accountability (Ntarfov87)  -0.03  -0.61  -3.77  0.16  -0.26  -0.06 
(-0.67)  (-0.14)  (-0.72)  (0.17)  (-0.52)  (-0.02) 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
Internal conflicts can be resolved and political stability can be achieved only through 
a transparent political process which takes on board all stakeholders and give equal 
space to each to raise their respective concerns and by holding fair accountability for 
all. If rich can get away with accountability process through manipulation of justice 
system,  then  larger  public  discontent  may  lead  to  public  unrest  resulting  in  the 
possibility of a violent conflict where larger segments of the society would take law in 
their hands. Class struggles in many developing countries have lead to civil unrest and 
cause internal conflict. The origins of many ethnic conflicts have also arisen due to 
lack of equal representation in sharing public offices and other positions of power by 
minorities.  The  root  cause  of  every  civil  conflict  links  up  with  discontent  which 
aggrieved parties show towards biased accountability process where one law is for the 
powerful  and  another  is  for  the  Junta.  Results in  table  3,  indicate  that  voice  and 
accountability is another important institutional process for an equal society. A strong 
evidence  of  redistribution  is  present  in  line  with  other  empirical  literature:  ‘The 
channels  of  communication  are  vital  for  development,  particularly  for  electoral 
democracies in the process of establishing effective political and economic institutions. In 
societies where press freedom is combined with widespread access to mass media, this is 
positively associated with good governance and with human development, through the 
role of the press in promoting the voice of disadvantaged groups in the policymaking 
process  and  strengthening  the  accountability  of  governments  to  citizens  and  thus 
decreasing inequality.’ (Norris 2001: 8).    8
Table 4: Democracy 
  Dependent Variables 






High20/Low20  Middle20  Low10  High10 
             
Democracy (Lcopen)  -0.004  -0.77  -0.649  0.23  -0.01  -0.63 
  (-1.65)*  (-1.84)*  (-1.66)*  (2.68)***  (-0.25)  (-2.15)** 
Democracy (Impnov85)  -0.005  -0.69  -0.79  0.21  -0.01  -0.51 
  (-1.73)*  (-1.84)*  (-1.65)***  (2.13)**  (-0.02)  (-1.56) 
Democracy (Impnov82)  -0.004  -0.88  -0.915  0.27  0.02  -0.74 
  (-1.94)*  (-2.20)**  (-1.99)  (2.93)***  (0.36)  (-2.41)** 
Democracy (Tarshov85)  -0.006  -0.62  -0.79  0.19  -0.01  -0.45 
  (-1.77)*  (-1.92)*  (-1.56)  (1.90)**  (-0.27)  (-1.33) 
Democracy (Tarshov82)  -0.005  -0.91  -0.97  0.27  0.02  -0.73 
  (-1.50)  (-2.15)**  (-2.02)**  (2.79)***  (0.51)  (-2.27)** 
Democracy (Open80s)  -0.007  0.56  -0.67  -0.02  -0.17  0.34 
  (-1.15)  (0.57)  (-0.67)  (-0.11)  (-1.32)  (0.48) 
Democracy (Tariffs)  -0.01  2.09  0.43  -0.39  -0.24  1.58 
  (-1.81)*  (0.95)  (0.33)  (-0.81)  (-1.10)  (0.92) 
Democracy (Owti)  -0.007  0.33  0.13  -0.05  -0.13  0.41 
  (-1.99)**  (0.38)  (0.19)  (-0.24)  (-1.12)  (0.53) 
Democracy (Txtrdg)  0.023  -1.83  -1.16  0.52  0.06  -1.72 
  (1.14)  (-1.80)*  (-1.13)  (2.20)**  (0.55)  (-2.06)** 
Democracy (Totimpov85)  0.0009  -1.35  0.59  0.24  0.19  0.97 
  (0.17)  (-2.25)**  (0.74)  (1.84)*  (2.86)***  (2.11)** 
Democracy (Owqi)  -0.01  0.74  0.40  -0.07  -0.13  0.458 
  (-1.87)*  (0.37)  (0.06)  (-0.17)  (-0.72)  (0.31) 
Democracy (Ntarfov87)  -0.007  0.96  0.44  -0.19  -0.12  1.52 
  (-1.13)  (1.30)  (0.85)  (-1.28)  (-1.50)  (-0.61) 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
 
According to Glaeser et al. (2004), good leadership is what matters and not whether a 
country is a democracy or a dictatorship. Irrespective to their convincing argument, 
there is a strong correlation run from democracy to redistribution through political 
stability: ‘Regimes controlled by rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy 
amidst  widespread  social  unrest.  Such  regime  changes  are  often  followed  by 
redistribution  to  the  poor  at  the  expense  of  the  former  elite.’  (p683)  Our  empirical 
analysis also finds that democracy is significantly and negatively related with income 
inequality, but the relation is indeed weak as can be seen by the low coefficients of 
Demo  for  Gini.  In  comparison  to  other  measures  of  political  institutions,  a  high 
number of cases of insignificance are observed in table 4.  
 
 A comparison of results for Auto in table 5 and Demo in table 4 for Theil99 suggests 
that democracies put a downward pressure on wage inequality while autocracies may 
favor skilled over unskilled. In light of redistributive potential of democracy, this 
result shows presence of skill bias among autocracies. Since a comparison is drawn 
between  democracies  and  autocracies  for  a  sample  of  developed  and  developing 
countries, this result on autocracies is more relevant for developing countries that may 
represent dictatorships who may promote such growth policies which would have 
unequal  outcomes  in  labor  markets.  Literature  also  suggests  that  differentiation 
between  political  make-ups  is  important  in  determining  the  wage  structure  in  a 
country. For example, democracies on average pay higher wages to the manufacturing 
sector. Rodrik (1999) finds  out that  average wages improve in the manufacturing 
sector with the enhancement of democratic institutions: ‘average wages in a country   9
like Mexico would be expected to increase by 10 to 40 percent were Mexico to attain a 
level  of  democracy  comparable  to  that  prevailing  in  United  States.’  (p.707)  Rockey 
(2007) adds up to this evidence as he finds that it is parliamentary democracies that 
are more effective in raising the average wage share of labor in manufacturing when 
compared to Presidential democracies.  
Table 5: Autocracy 
  Dependent Variables 






High20/Low20  Middle20  Low10  High10 
             
Autocracy (Lcopen)  0.006  0.37  0.70  -0.17  0.07  0.38 
  (1.64)*  (0.70)  (1.11)  (-1.49)  (1.23)  (0.98) 
Autocracy (Impnov85)  0.006  0.43  0.92  -0.16  0.06  0.29 
  (1.35)  (0.75)  (1.45)  (-1.20)  (0.96)  (0.65) 
Autocracy (Impnov82)  0.0041  0.69  0.64  -0.26  0.03  0.63 
  (1.85)*  (1.20)  (0.97)  (-1.94)*  (0.49)  (1.43) 
Autocracy (Tarshov85)  0.006  0.29  0.94  -0.12  0.07  0.17 
  (1.65)*  (0.49)  (1.43)  (-0.92)  (1.06)  (0.37) 
Autocracy (Tarshov82)  0.005  0.63  -0.19  -0.23  0.02  0.55 
  (1.84)*  (1.08)  (-0.18)  (-1.74)*  (0.38)  (1.22) 
Autocracy (Open80s)  0.004  -1.69  -0.47  0.26  0.27  -1.16 
  (0.75)  (-1.47)  (-0.38)  (1.11)  (2.02)**  (-1.39) 
Autocracy (Tariffs)  0.01  -1.899  -0.71  0.361  0.21  -1.14 
  (2.39)**  (-1.19)  (-0.75)  (1.00)  (1.38)  (-1.15) 
Autocracy (Owti)  0.008  -1.13  -0.55  0.23  0.22  -1.04 
  (2.04)**  (-0.96)  (-0.34)  (0.77)  (1.60)  (-1.04) 
Autocracy (Txtrdg)  -0.02  -0.70  -0.88  -0.04  0.25  -0.03 
  (-0.97)  (-0.46)  (-0.93)  (-0.12)  (1.28)  (-0.03) 
Autocracy (Totimpov85)  0.0002  -1.78  -0.62  -0.31  0.23  -1.28 
  (0.04)  (-2.43)**  (-0.44)  (-2.07)**  (2.88)*  (-2.34)** 
Autocracy (Owqi)  0.011  -0.10  -0.25  0.13  0.18  -0.68 
  (1.88)*  (-0.45)  (-0.62)  (0.26)  (0.91)  (-0.40) 
Autocracy (Ntarfov87)  0.008  -1.27  -0.44  0.27  0.16  -1.11 
  (1.86)*  (-1.54)  (-0.25)  (1.59)  (1.64)  (-1.83)* 
-***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
- Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
Coming back to the results on autocracy, they reveal that autocracies also perform 
poorly in favor of redistribution and if anything they are negatively related with the 
incomes of the poor and the middle class. In contrast, democracies seem to favor 
middle-class more than anybody else, confirming the median voter argument that 
democratized countries with greater inequality of factor income tend to redistribute 
from more to the less affluent. (Milanovic 2000)  
 
4.  Conclusions: 
 
So what lessons are available from these results? Should it be that a country might 
compromise on democracy and follow a politically repressed system of dictatorial 
rule?  Both  questions  are  applicable  to  developing  countries  where  most  of  the 
underperforming economies are lead by dictatorial regimes whether in Asia, Africa or 
Latin  America. However,  there are salient  exceptions too where  it  seems that  the 
definition  of  western  democracy  remains  unfulfilled  but  an  enlightened  model  of 
economic management has been adopted and success has been achieved as far as 
growth dividends are concerned. So how may one contrast such exceptions with the   10
ones where autocracy has lead to repressed market structures? Is it all about market 
efficiency  to  defend  an  autocratic  structure?  The  present  results  illuminate  these 
questions of whether equity and not only growth is the objective for a developing 
country’s  policy  apparatus.  If  somehow  a  less  democratic  political  system  may 
strengthen legal, social and economic institutions and promote political stability, it 
would not matter whether a western model of democracy is implemented by its word 
and spirit or some case specific combination of political and social methodologies 
adopted.  
 
Democracy is definitely not a sufficient condition in itself for contributing towards the 
equity or even economic progress of a country. Rather democracy is just another part 
of the jigsaw puzzle, which may only fit in properly at its right time when other 
institutional  variables  have  evolved  appropriately  to  support  its  conceptual 
application. Most democracies must have been autocracies or near autocracies when 
the political process started out and this means mere concentration on democracy is 
futile to find solutions for institutional or macroeconomic progress. Rather consider 
democracy  a  notion  suggesting  an  objective  and  well-developed  end  for  the 
confirmation of economic, social, cultural and scientific development rather than a 
means  to  an  end.  However,  in  today’s  rapidly  transforming  world  where  some 
developing countries may benefit from global markets more than others, they would 
find themselves under increasing pressure from their populations to transform into a 
more  democratized  system  of  governance  once  they  witnessed  higher  levels  of 
economic and  institutional  development.  In  such  scenarios,  countries  that  may  be 
doing well under well-defined autocratic set ups may not only have to decide to bring 
western models of democracy to align their social development with global standards, 
but more importantly, they have to decide the timing of such critical transitions. This 
will ensure the sustainability of the economic progress they achieved as any abrupt 
changes always carry higher risks. (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005) 
 
Nevertheless, all such autocratic regimes which are controlled by ruling elites have a 
high risk of collapse amidst widespread social unrest. Thus it is beneficial for the 
ruling  class  to  bring  increased  democratization  in  the  country  because  temporary 
concessions in light of social pressure can be viewed as a sign of weakness and this 
may give way to further unrest and cause dramatic change in regimes and increasing 
the  risk  of  a  civil  war  unless  the  most  generous  concession,  a  transition  to  full 
democracy, is not made. Finally, democratization lies in the very interest of autocracy 
while the transition to democracy is often followed by redistribution to the poor at the 
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